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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Donald Showalter sued his former employer, the 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center ("UPMC"), in federal 
district court, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. S 621 et seq. UPMC 
moved for summary judgment, and a Magistrate Judge 1 
granted its motion, holding (1) that "Showalter c[ould] not 
establish the fourth element of his prima facie case because 
UPMC did not retain unprotected workers" and (2) that 
Showalter could not "discredit UPMC's articulated 
legitimate reasons for his dismissal or establish that age 
discrimination motivated UPMC's decision." App. at 62. We 
hold that the Magistrate Judge erred in making both legal 
determinations, and we therefore reverse the grant of 




During the early 1990's, the Presbyterian University 
Hospital ("Presbyterian"), which UPMC already owned, 
merged with the Montefiore University Hospital 
("Montefiore"). Until approximately October 1994, UPMC 
maintained separate security departments at Montefiore 
and Presbyterian. As of May 1994, George Eror directed 
Montefiore's security department, which had four security 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court, after receiving the consent of both parties 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 636(c)(1) (1994), issued an order assigning this 
case to the Magistrate Judge. App. at 46. Showalter was entitled to 
appeal the judgment of the Magistrate Judge directly to this Court. See 
28 U.S.C. S 636(c)(3) (amended 1996). 
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supervisors, and Donald Charley directed Presbyterian's 
security department, which had three security supervisors. 
Appellant's Br. at 11. 
 
Because of budgetary constraints, UPMC required 
Montefiore and Presbyterian to eliminate one security 
supervisor each in May 1994. The four Montefiore security 
supervisors were Messrs. Showalter, Leahy, Wright, and 
Delbane, who were 61, 52, 45, and 38 years old, 
respectively. Eror terminated Delbane, the youngest of the 
four Montefiore supervisors, because he had the weakest 
performance rating. App. at 88. In reaching this decision, 
Eror compared Delbane only with other Montefiore security 
supervisors and not with Presbyterian security supervisors. 
Likewise, Charley evaluated Presbyterian security 
supervisors only against other Presbyterian security 
supervisors. App. at 75-78. 
 
In August 1994, UPMC required Montefiore to eliminate 
another security supervisor. Because the three remaining 
supervisors had virtually indistinguishable performance 
records, Eror decided to terminate the individual with the 
least department seniority. According to David Treece -- the 
human resource employee who advised both Eror and 
Charley in personnel matters, such as reduction-in-force 
("RIF") decisions -- UPMC department heads used one of 
the following three types of seniority to make RIF decisions: 
job seniority (time employed at a given position), 
department seniority (time employed in a given 
department), and hospital seniority (time employed by the 
hospital). App. at 84, 86. 
 
Neither party disputes that Showalter had less 
department seniority than Leahy or Wright, nor does either 
party dispute that Wright had less job seniority than 
Showalter. Thus, had Eror selected job seniority rather 
than department seniority as the basis for making his 
decision, Wright would have been terminated instead of 
Showalter. In addition, it is undisputed that Showalter had 
more seniority -- of either the job or department variety -- 
than any of the Presbyterian security supervisors. 
Consequently, had Eror compared Showalter to both 
Montefiore and Presbyterian security supervisors, 
Showalter would not have been terminated. 
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The Magistrate Judge granted UPMC's motion for 
summary judgment for two reasons: first, he held that 
Showalter failed to establish a prima facie case of age 
discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973); and second, he held that even if 
Showalter had established a prima facie case of age 
discrimination, Showalter did not submit evidence" `from 
which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the 
employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that 
an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than 
not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's 
action.' " App. at 58 (Magistrate Judge Opinion) (quoting 
Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 




We exercise plenary review over an order granting 
summary judgment, and we apply the same standard that 
the lower court should have applied. Armbruster v. Unisys 
Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). A federal court 
should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). In making this determination,"a court 
must view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's 
favor." Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 777. 
 
On appeal, Showalter makes two arguments. First, 
Showalter contends that the Magistrate Judge applied the 
wrong legal standard in determining that he did not satisfy 
the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie 
test. Second, Showalter claims that he submitted evidence 
from which a reasonable factfinder could disbelieve UPMC's 
proffered reasons for terminating him.2  We will address 
each argument in turn. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Showalter does not argue that he presented evidence from which a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that UPMC was more likely than 
not motivated by an invidious discriminatory reason. 
 




We agree with appellant's argument that the Magistrate 
Judge applied the wrong legal standard in determining that 
Showalter did not satisfy the fourth element of a prima 
facie age discrimination case under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework. McDonnell Douglas set forth a burden-shifting 
framework for the presentation of evidence in 
discriminatory treatment cases litigated under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-1 et seq. 
This Court "has applied a slightly modified version of this 
scheme in ADEA cases." Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 
130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc); cf . O'Connor 
v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 
(assuming, without deciding, that the McDonnell Douglas 
framework applies to ADEA cases). In Keller, we wrote: 
 
       The McDonnell Douglas scheme has three steps. First, 
       the plaintiff must produce evidence that is sufficient to 
       convince a reasonable factfinder to find all of the 
       elements of a prima facie case. . . . When the plaintiff 
       alleges unlawful discharge based on age, the prima 
       facie case requires proof that (i) the plaintiff was a 
       member of the protected class, i.e., was 40 years of age 
       or older (see 29 U.S.C. S 631(a)), (ii) that the plaintiff 
       was discharged, (iii) that the plaintiff was qualified for 
       the job, and (iv) that the plaintiff was replaced by a 
       sufficiently younger person to create an inference of 
       age discrimination. 
 
130 F.3d at 1108 (citations omitted). 
 
This Court has held that in RIF cases, "this framework is 
inadequate with respect to the last factor." Armbruster, 32 
F.3d at 777. Instead, the plaintiff must show that the 
employer retained "unprotected workers." Id. (citing Seman 
v. Coplay Cement Co., 26 F.3d 428, 431 (3d Cir. 1994), 
abrogated on other grounds by Smith v. Borough of 
Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 1998); Billet v. 
Cigna Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 816 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1991), 
abrogated on other grounds by St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1993)). 
 
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then "[t]he 
burden of production (but not the burden of persuasion) 
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shifts to the defendant, who must then offer evidence that 
is sufficient, if believed, to support a finding that it had a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge." 
Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108 (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07 
(1993)). Should the defendant fail to satisfy this burden, 
judgment should be entered for the plaintiff. Id. But if the 
defendant satisfies this burden, then the burden of 
production shifts back to the plaintiff to proffer evidence 
" `from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) 
disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or 
(2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was 
more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of 
the employer's action.' " Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 
F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 
In the instant case, the appellant satisfied thefirst three 
prima facie elements, and thus only the fourth element is 
at issue. The Magistrate Judge held that because UPMC did 
not retain unprotected supervisors from Montefiore, i.e., 
supervisors under the age of 40, appellant could not satisfy 
the fourth element, and summary judgment was therefore 
appropriate. App. at 56-57, 62. 
 
In light of our opinions in Armbruster, Seman, and Billet, 
all of which held that the fourth element of a prima facie 
age discrimination case in a RIF context requires the 
plaintiff to show that unprotected workers were retained,3 
the Magistrate Judge understandably applied this standard 
rather than requiring Showalter to show that the retained 
workers were "sufficiently younger" than he was at the time 
of discharge. See Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108; see also Healy 
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1214 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1988) (holding, in a RIF context, that the fourth prima facie 
element is satisfied if the plaintiff can "show that he was 
discharged, while the company retained someone younger"). 
Nevertheless, in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in 
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 
(1996), we hold that the District Court should have applied 
the "sufficiently younger" standard instead of the 
"unprotected class membership" standard. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 777; Seman, 26 F.3d at 431; Billet, 940 
F.2d at 816 n.3. 
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In O'Connor, the Supreme Court addressed the question 
"whether a plaintiff alleging that he was discharged in 
violation of the [ADEA] must show that he was replaced by 
someone outside the age group protected by the ADEA to 
make out a prima facie case under the framework 
established by McDonnell Douglas[.]" Id. at 309. A 
unanimous Court held that "the fact that an ADEA plaintiff 
was replaced by someone outside the protected class is not 
a proper element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie 
case." 517 U.S. at 312. The Court explained: 
 
       The discrimination prohibited by the ADEA is 
       discrimination "because of [an] individual's age," 29 
       U.S.C. S 623(a)(1), though the prohibition is"limited to 
       individuals who are at least 40 years of age,"S 631(a). 
       This language does not ban discrimination against 
       employees because they are aged 40 or older; it bans 
       discrimination against employees because of their age, 
       but limits the protected class to those who are 40 or 
       older. The fact that one person in the protected class 
       has lost out to another person in the protected class is 
       thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of 
       his age. Or to put the point more concretely, there can 
       be no greater inference of age discrimination (as 
       opposed to "40 or over" discrimination) when a 40 
       year-old is replaced by a 39 year-old than when a 56 




While the Court limited its review to the lower court's 
"treatment of [the] case as a non-reduction-in-force case," 
id. at 310 n.1, its reasoning applies with equal force in a 
RIF case.4 To hold otherwise in this appeal would require 
us to interpret 29 U.S.C. SS 623(a)(1), 631(a) as if the 
statutory language permits an inference of age 
discrimination when a 40 year-old is discharged and a 39 
year-old is retained, but permits no inference of age 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Notwithstanding the Magistrate Judge's decision to apply the 
"unprotected class membership" standard, he conceded that "the 
[O'Connor] Court's reasoning would seem to apply equally to RIF cases," 
but then rejected the "sufficiently younger" standard because the 
Supreme Court limited its holding to non-RIF cases. App. at 55 n.3. 
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discrimination when, as in this case, a 60 year-old is 
discharged and a 44 year-old is retained. Such a holding 
would contravene the logic of O'Connor. 
 
Further support for applying a "sufficiently younger" 
standard in a RIF context is found in Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 
F.3d 825 (3d Cir. 1994). There, a former employee (Torre), 
who was 59 years old when discharged, sued Casio under 
the ADEA. Torre had been a regional sales manager in the 
audio/visual division for the eastern sales region. Id. at 
827. Torre alleged that his supervisor transferred him in 
April 1990 into a "dead-end position . . . from which he 
could be fired at a more propitious -- and seemingly 
innocent -- moment." Id. That moment came approximately 
one month later in May 1990 when Casio notified Torre of 
his discharge "as part of a reduction in force." Id. at 827- 
28. 
 
This Court observed that "[a]t the time Torre was 
transferred and then discharged, the two other [regional 
sales managers in the audio/visual division] . . . -- aged 38 
and 41, respectively -- were retained in their positions," 
and "when Torre was terminated in the reduction in force, 
other similarly-situated but younger employees were 
retained by Casio." Id. at 831. We then held that the fourth 
prima facie element "must be relaxed in certain 
circumstances, as when there is a reduction in force," id., 
and essentially adopted a "sufficiently younger" standard 
that permitted an inference of age discrimination even if a 
retained worker was over the age of 40. Id. Thus, in view of 
the Supreme Court's reasoning in O'Connor and our 
opinion in Torre, we hold that the Magistrate Judge erred in 
applying the "unprotected class membership" standard 
rather than the "sufficiently younger" standard as the 
fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test. 
 
In order for a plaintiff to satisfy the "sufficiently younger" 
standard, we have noted that there is no "particular age 
difference that must be shown," but while "[d]ifferent courts 
have held . . . that a five year difference can be sufficient, 
. . . a one year difference cannot." Sempier v. Johnson & 
Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
In this case, Showalter was eight years older than Leahy 
and 16 years older than Wright. We hold that the 
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differences in age between Showalter and the retained 
employees were sufficient to satisfy the fourth element of a 
prima facie case. See Sempier, 45 F.3d at 730 (holding that 
the fourth prong of a prima facie age discrimination case 
was satisfied where plaintiff was replaced by two 
individuals -- one who was four years younger than 




We now turn to Showalter's second argument, i.e., that 
Showalter submitted evidence from which a reasonable 
factfinder could disbelieve UPMC's proffered reasons for 
terminating him. UPMC provided the following justification 
for terminating Showalter: it claimed that economic 
circumstances prompted it to terminate a Montefiore 
security supervisor and that it selected Showalter because 
he had the least department seniority of the three 
Montefiore security supervisors. App. at 64 (UPMC's Brief 
in Support of Its Summary Judgment Motion). 
 
Showalter contends that "[a] factfinder could reasonably 
infer from the evidence that the decision-maker, UPMC 
Security Director Eror, terminated Showalter after 
assuming authority over the consolidated supervisory 
security staffs and was terminating him from the 
consolidated unit, not [Montefiore]." Appellant's Br. at 18. 
We disagree. Neither party disputes that Eror notified 
Showalter of his discharge by letter, dated August 29, 
1994. Charley provided the earliest date in the record for 
when Eror assumed authority over the consolidated 
supervisory security staffs. He testified: "I don't remember 
the exact date. I believe it was some time either at the end 
of August, beginning part of September, around that time 
frame; but exactly when, I don't recall." App. at 66-67. 
Eror, on the other hand, testified that he began supervising 
the consolidated Montefiore and Presbyterian security 
department in October 1994. See App. at 113. Similarly, 
David Treece, in a memorandum dated August 25, 1994, 
stated that "Eror [would] assume responsibility for both 
[Montefiore] and [Presbyterian] Security in mid or late 
September." App. at 78. Thus, the record provides little, if 
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any, evidence that Eror was in charge of a consolidated 
security department by the end of August. 
 
Moreover, there is no evidence that UPMC had made any 
employment decisions as of that date in which it compared 
Montefiore security supervisors with Presbyterian security 
supervisors or vice-versa. On the contrary, the only 
evidence regarding prior UPMC RIF decisions shows that 
Montefiore security supervisors were compared only with 
other Montefiore security supervisors and that Presbyterian 
security supervisors were compared only with other 
Presbyterian security supervisors. Viewing all this evidence, 
we hold that no reasonable factfinder could reject as 
pretextual UPMC's explanation that it compared Showalter 
with only other Montefiore employees because that was its 
traditional practice. 
 
Showalter also argues that a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that UPMC's decision to use department seniority 
as the basis for terminating the contested RIF decision was 
actually a pretext for age discrimination. We agree. In his 
deposition, Treece stated in effect that, when a layoff was to 
be made based on seniority, UPMC did not have afixed 
policy as to which type of seniority should be used. App. at 
84. Rather, according to Treece, "it was a common practice 
that in any reduction in force [he] would look at alternative 
methods of calculating seniority to determine who would be 
affected by the layoff." Id. Treece stated that he discussed 
the consequences of using alternative forms of seniority 
with Eror prior to Showalter's termination. App. at 86b-86c. 
Furthermore, Charley testified that when he made RIF 
decisions, Treece generally advised him of the three 
available seniority options and which individuals would be 
discharged under each option. App. at 71-72. Eror, on the 
other hand, contradicted their testimony. While he recalled 
discussing the RIF decision at issue with Treece, he claimed 
that Treece did not inform him of any seniority option other 
than department seniority. App. at 106. Indeed, Eror 
testified that "as far as [he] knew," department seniority 
was always used for a RIF. App. at 106-07. 
 
Based on this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could find 
that Eror's explanation for his choice of departmental 
seniority -- i.e., that as far as he knew, this form of 
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seniority was always used in a RIF -- was pretextual. A 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that Eror had the 
discretion to choose any of the three forms of seniority; that 
he knew in advance the result that each choice would 
produce; and that he selected department seniority because 
he knew it would result in the layoff of the oldest employee, 
Showalter. Accordingly, we hold that the Magistrate Judge 
erred in holding that Showalter did not adduce evidence 
from which a reasonable factfinder could disbelieve UPMC's 




For these reasons, we reverse the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of UPMC and remand for further 
proceedings. 
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